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ABSTRACTS

Mary lane Plumer
APPEAL AND ERROR-REVERSIBLE ERROR TO INSTRUCT JURY THAT MATERIAL FACTS MusT BE PROVED WITHOUT TELLING THEM WHICH FACTS
ARE MATERIAL-Appellants were indicted for robbery and found guilty in the
trial court. They appealed, contending that the jury was improperly instructed,
the objectionable instructions being that the jury might find the appellant guilty
if it believed from the evidence that every material allegation had been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt; and that the reasonable doubt sufficient for an acquittal must be as to the whole evidence and not as to any particular fact not necessary to constitute the crime. There was no instruction, however, as to what
constituted material facts. Appellee contended that, because_ a definition of the
crime of robbery was included, the instructions were adequate. Held, reversed
and remanded. It has been previously held in this jurisdiction 1 to be reversible
error to instruct the jury that it need find beyond a reasonable doubt the truth
of only those allegations which are material, without instructing them also as to
what constitutes material allegations. The definition of robbery was a mere
abstract proposition of law 2 and was not sufficient to point out what allegations
were material. The jury was, therefore, left with the determination of questions
of law. People v. Berne, (Ill. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 578.
ARREST-ARE THE SURETIES ON A SHERIFF's BoND LIABLE FOR AcTS
Do NE UNDER COLOR OF OFFICE BUT BEYOND THE ScoPE OF THE PowERS
WHICH THE OFFICE CONFERS ON SHERIFF?-Plaintiff sued F as sheriff of
Wells county and I as surety on his official bond, alleging that he had been unlawfully arrested by F's deputy beyond the borders of Wells county and afterwards imprisoned unlawfully in Wells county where F, "while acting by virtue
of his office," had permitted the jail to become so damp and cold that he had suffered injuries. The trial court, sustaining the demurrers of F and I, stated that
a sufficient cause of action had not been shown against either defendant and gave
judgment accordingly. Plaintiff appeals. Held, affirmed as to F but reversed as
to I. F cannot be sued in his capacity of sheriff as principal on the bond because
there he obligated himself as an individual for the faithful performance of his
official duties. Even if the action lay in tort, rather than on the bond, for any
official wrong doing he could be sued only as an individual; otherwise the judgment would be one against the office and the funds of the office. I argues that
F was not acting in his official capacity when the arrest was made and cites a
1
2

People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 44 N.E. (2d) 32 (1942).
On authority of People v. Cramer, 298 Ill. 509, 131 N.E. 657 (1921).
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Kentucky case 1 involving an unlawful arrest that upholds this view. The court
reasons that if an official "is acting only as an individual and not as a sheriff
whenever he exceeds his authority in making an arrest, there could never be
liability on his bond for a false arrest." 2 The test should be whether the act was
done under color of office rather than by virtue of office. If he assumed to act
as an officer, then bondsmen should be lfable for they sponsored his integrity
while acting as an officer and bound themselves that he would not "under color
of his office exceed the powers which the office confers upon him." 3 The test
of whether he is acting in his official capacity should be whether he "acts within
the general scope of the powers and duties of his position." 4 Because the unlawful arrest was made beyond the borders of Wells county does not, under
Indiana law, necessarily prevent it from being made under color of office. 5 Even
if it could be considered that the original arrest was the wrongful act of an
individual, the arrest continued unlawfully in Wells county and under color of
F's office. State v. French, (Ind. 1943) 51 N. E. (2d) 858.
CoNTRACTS-THIRD-P ARTY BENEFICIARIES-RIGHT OF BENEFICIARY OF
UNITED STATES SAVINGS BoNDs AS AGAINST EsTATE OF DECEASED OWNER-

In the safe deposit box of D, who died intestate, were found Unite'ci States discount savings bonds, series E, issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act,1 and
which were registered in D's name as owner. One of these was payable on his
death to his widow and the others to named children. On an exception made by
one of the heirs to the inventory filed in D's estate, the probate court directed
the administratrix to exclude these bonds from the inventory. The judgment
was affirmed by the court of appeals and the case cam·e to this court on allowance
of motion t9 certify the record. Held, affirmed, on the ground that the bonds
belonged to the beneficiaries rather than to D's estate. Rhorbacker, Exr. v. Citizens Building Ass'n Co. 2 was cited as supporting the principle that "the proceeds
of a contract made for the benefit of a third party are not subject to administration in the estate of the donor but belong to' the person for whose benefit the
contract was made." 3 It was argued that since D could have cashed the bonds
during his lifetime the proceeds should belong to his estate, but the court observed
that D had no power to change the beneficiary. 4 The court in rendering its
decision relied principally on a regulation by the Secretary of the Treasury which
stated that "If the registered owner dies without having prese,nted ... the bond
Jones v. Van Bever, 164 Ky. So, 174 S.W. So (1915).
Principal case at p. 862.
3 Ibid.
4 Id. at 864.
5 Under Ind. Stat. (Burns, 1933) §§ 9-1008, 9-10II, a sheriff may make arrests
in certain cases beyond the limits of his own county.
·1

2

' 1 The bonds were issued after the Second Liberty Bond Act had been amended by
the addition of§ 22 which was added by act of February 4, 1935, 49 Stat. L. 21 and
c. 7, § 3 of act of February 19, 1941, 55 Stat. L. 7, 31 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1943) § 757c.
2 138 Ohio St. 273, 34 N. E. (2d) 751 (1942).
3 Principal case at 641.
·
4 6 FED. REG.,§ 315.12(b), p. 2197 (1942).
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for payment ..• the beneficiary will be recognized by the Treasury Department
as the sole and absolute owner of the bond, and payment will be made only to
him .••." 5 The appellant contended that this provision was merely for the
convenience of the Treasury in facilitating payment of the bonds. Although the
court agreed that this motive was undoubtedly present, it stated that this provision was made a part of the contract between the Government and the bondholder by section 22 (a) of the Second Liberty Bond Act 6 and was sufficiently
definite in its terms to pass title to the beneficiaries.7 In re Di Santo's Estate,
(Ohio 1943) 51 N. E. (2d) 639.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-PROSECUTION AFTER REVOCATION OF
OPA REGULATION FOR PREVIOUS VIOLATION-Appellees were indicted for
selling beef in violation of an OPA regulation made pursuant to the Emergency
Price Control Act of I 942. Their motion to quash was granted in the district
court on the ground that the pertinent provisions of the regulations had been
revoked prior to the return of the indictment. Held, on appeal under the Criminal Appeals Act,2 reversed. The common law rule that the repeal of a statute
ends the power to prosecute under it for previous violations does not apply in the
case of revoked regulations where the statute under which the regulation was
made is still in force. The reason for this difference is that in the present case,
the policy of the statute still continues and it is the violation of the statute that is
punished. United States v. Hark, (U.S. 1943) 64 S. Ct. 359.
EQuITY-JURISDICTION-Surr BY PROPERTY OWNER AGAINST SEVERAL
INSURERS OF THE SAME PROPERTY WHERE POLICIES CONTAIN PRORATING
CLAUSES-The plaintiff, owner of the Gulfmore Hotel which had been destroyed by fire, brought this action in equity against twenty-two insurance companies on forty-five fire insurance policies covering the building and the personal
property therein. Each policy contained a clause providing for the prorating of
the loss in proportion to the amounts of insurance named in the several policies.
The county court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant
appealed, claiming that equity had no jurisdiction due to the fact that the Civil
Practice Act now permits an ·action at law against all defendants to recover the
amount due from each. Held, equity properly took jurisdiction of this case, on
the basis of avoidance of a multiplicity of suits, and a common interest arising
5 Treasury Department Circular 530, fifth revision, dated June 1, 1942, found in
6 FED. REG.,§ 315.12, p. 2191.
6 Section 22(a) of the Second Liberty Bond Act, cited supra, note 1, states that
bonds "shall be issued ... subject to such terms ... and including any restriction on
their transfer, as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time prescribe."
7 See annotations on rights of beneficiary under obligation or deposit payable to him
at death of holder or depositor if not previously paid to latter, in 144 A.L.R. l 523
(1943); 146 A.L.R. 1498 (1943); 131 A.L.R. 967 (1941). For a case contra to
principal case, see 27 MINN. L. REv. 401 (1943).

56 Stat. L. 23, 50 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1943) App. § 901.
18 U.S.C.A. (1926) § 682. The problem of whether the appeal was properly
taken under the act is also discussed in the opinion.
1

2
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out of the clause in each policy providing for prorating the loss. Giving the
plaintiff a single action at law against all defendants does not affect the situation,
for equity is not deprived of jurisdiction by extending it to courts of law unless
the legislature has clearly so manifested its intention. Equity has another ground
for jurisdiction in that an accounting in this case would be, far too complicated
for an ordinary jury and could therefore be done more satisfactorily by a chancery master. lay-Bee Realty Corporation v. Agricultural Ins. Co., (Ill. App.
1943) 50 N.E. (2d) 973.
'

FEDERAL COURTS-JURISDICTION OF CASES SOUGHT TO BE REMOVED
FROM A STATE COURT WHICH HAS NO JuRISDICTION.-Plaintiff brought an
action against Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. in Civil Court of
Record to recover $3000 damages for breach of contract and $3000 damages
for conversion of plaintiff's copper wire. Defendant petitioned for removal to a
federal court under the Federal Removal Statute 1 on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. The· county court judge dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction, that court having no jurisdiction of matters in controversy the value of
which exceeds $3000.2 Held, dismissed. In the removal of causes depending
for jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, the federal court acquire,s no jurisdiction if the state had none, even though the federal court might have had
jurisdiction if the case had originally been brought there. Neel v. Southern Bell
Telephone and Telegraph Co., (D.C. Fla. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 415.
FEDERAL CouRTS-JURISDICTION-CRoss-CLAIM BY ONE DEFENDANT
AGAINST ANOTHER AS A SEPARABLE CONTROVERSY-Plaintiff instituted a personal injury action in a county court of South Carolina against defendants Piatt
and the Atlantic Coastline Railroad for injuries sustained when he was struck
by portions of a truck belonging to Piatt, thrown in his direct;ion as a result of
the collision between the truck and a train of Atlantic Coastline Railroad. The
railroad :filed a cross-claim against Piatt charging negligence and petitioned for
removal to a federal court, under the Federal Removal Statute,1 oh two grounds;
:first that there was diversity of citizenship among the original parties, the plaintiff
being a citizen of South Carolina, while the railroad was a Virginia corporation
and Piatt a citizen of-Missouri, and second that there was a separable controversy
between citizens of different states arising out of the cross-claim. Held, federal
jurisdiction denied. The diversity of citizenship required for removal is not
present, since as a matter of fact Piatt was not a citizen of Missouri but of South
Carolina. No separable controversy, within the meaning of the statute, arises
out of the cross-claim because it is an independant claim brought by one who,
though a defendant in name, is a plaintiff in interest, and is therefore unable to
remove. Cases cited by the railroad are distinguishable in that in one the crossclaim presented a federal question, and in the others, the petition for removal
was made by one impleaded by a defendant. Barwick v. Piatt, (D.C.S.C. 1943)
52 F. Supp. 262.
2

28 U.S.C.A. (1926) § 71.
Fla. Acts: 1921, c. 8521, p. 312.

1

28 U.S.C.A. (1926) § 71.

1
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INSURANCE-EFFECT OF INACCURACIES IN DESCRIPTION OF AN AUTOMOBILE IN A PUBLIC LIABILITY PoLICY-Wilber Soden, being the owner of a
1937 model, four-door Plymouth sedan, was issued a public liability insurance
policy by the garnishee in this case, Utilities Insurance Company, in which the
company's promise to the insured was to pay, up to certain specified limits, all
sums which the insured should become legally liable to pay to persons sustaining
damage through the insured's ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
The policy called for a description of the automobile which was filled in with
the year model of one car and the motor and serial numbers and type of body
of another, all taken from a policy formerly issued to Soden by this company to
cover a different car for a different period. Soden owned only one car during
the period of the policy and the premium rates were the same for it as for the
model in the description. The appellants, as administratrices for two persons
killed while riding with Soden in his car, having brought suit and obtained judgments against the administrator of Soden's estate for damages on account of the
wrongful death of their intestates, filed a writ of garnishment against the insurance company, relying on the public liability policy. The trial court gave judgments for the plaintiffs to the extent of the company's liability on the policy, and
the appellate court reversed 1 on the ground that, because of the inaccuracies in
the description, the policy did not cover the automobile driven by Soden at the
time of the accident. Held, appellate court reversed, trial court affirmed. The
purpose of the description is to set forth the type of coverage and the limits of
liability, and to give enough facts so that the insurance company can tell who is
to be insured and what automobile to be covered. The insurance company knew
or reasonably could have known from the declarations in the policy who was to
be insured, and, on the basis of decisions in other jurisdictions,2 when the insured
owns only one car at the time the policy is issued, and that car is involved in an
accident, the insurance company is deemed to know that that is the car covered,
notwithstanding inaccuracies in the motor and serial numbers. This doctrine is
limited to accident policies, as distinguished from fire and theft policies, and to
automobiles owned by the insured at the time the policy was issued. Kostecki
v. Zaffina, (Ill. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 152.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - CHANGE OF MANUFACTURING BUILDING
PURPOSE TO A HIGHER NON-CONFORMING UsE WHERE ZoNING ORDINANCE
RESTRICTS AREA TO RESIDENTIAL PuRPOsEs-Plaintiff owned property which
was used as a garage from 1918 until 1936; from 1936 until February, 1942, it
was used for the manufacturing of metal products on a twenty-four hour a day
work schedule. In December, 1941, a zoning ordinance of the city of Detroit
became effective which restricted the area in which plaintiff's property was located to "two and a half story-two family dwellings," and further provided that
where a non-conforming building presently existed, "any such non-conforming
building or structure may be continued and maintained provided there is no
physical change." When plaintiff's petition to increase the size of its building
316 Ill. App. 509, 45 N.E. (2d) 562 (1942).
Fucaloro v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 225 Iowa 437, 280 N.W. 605
(1938); Reimers v. International Indemnity Co., 143 Wash. 193, 254 P. 852 (1927).
1

2
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was thereafter denied by the zoning appeal board, the business operations were
moved to larger q~arters. Plaintiff has now leased the vacated premises to a
cartage,company, which has agreed to occupy the premises solely as a sorting and
distributing point, and not to use the building after 7 P.M. Plaintiff applied for
permission to change building purpose from manufacturing to cartage; the application being denied, plaintiff filed petition for writ of mandamus in the
circuit court, and on denial thereof leave to appeal was granted. Held, reversed
and remanded. The sole test of legality of a zoning ordinance is its reasonableness, and to construe this ordinance as preventing a change of purpose to a higher
non-conforming order (i.e. one not as objectionable as the former one) is so
unreasonable in this particular case as to invoke the aid of the court. The court
apparently adopts plaintiff's suggested construction of the words "any such nonconforming use may be continued" to refer generally to any non-conforming
use and not to be limited to the identical, and, in this case, more objectionable,
non-conforming use at the time the ordinance went into effect. Palmer v. City
of Detroit, (Mich. 1943) II N.W. (2d) 199.
PROCESS-STATUTE CONSTITUTING SECRETARY OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BUREAU AGENT OF NONRESIDENT EMPLOYER FOR ACCEPTANCE
OF SERVICE - Plaintiff was employed by defendants as a domestic servant in
their New Jersey home, and now alleges that she sustained injuries during the
course of such employment. After defendants moved their residence to New
York, plaintiff filed a petition with the workmen's compensation bureau ( copy
of which was mailed to defendants), jurisdiction being taken by the bureau under
the authority of a New Jersey Statute 1 which provides that any non-resident
employer is deemed by accepting the privilege of such services to have appointed
the secretary of the bureau as his agent for acceptance of process in any proceeding instituted by an employee. Defendants appeared before the bureau specially
and moved to dismiss and quash the process on ground of want of jurisdiction.
The bureau denied defendant's motion to quash, and a writ of certiorari to review was denied by the supreme court. Defendants appeal. Held, reversed. The
statute in question applies to non-residents who employ persons within the statedefendants were not non-residents at the time of the employment, and the fact ,
that after accrual of the cause of action they moved from the jurisdiction did not
bring them within the operation of the statute. In the absence of specific statutory provision, process served upon non-resident defendants in an action in
personam is invalid. This case does not fall within any legislative exception to
the general rule, and, therefore, the bureau acquired no jurisdiction over the defendants. Y ardborough 'ii, Slokum, (N.J. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 905.
PROXIMATE CAUSE-CAN NEGLIGENCE OF DEFENDANT BE PROXIMATE
CAUSE DESPITE INTERVENING AcT OF THIRD PARTY?-Appellee's agent, in
violation of a traffic ordinance of the District of Columbia, left ~ppellee's truck
standing in a public alley with ignition unlocked and key in the switch. An unknown person drove the car- away and negligently ran over app~llant. In an
action against appellee for damages, the trial court; on an agreed set of facts,
directed a verdict for appellant on the theory that, a third party having inter1

N.

J. Rev. Stat.

(1937), §§ 34:15-55:1.
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vened, leaving the car unlocked was not the proximate cause of appellee's injury.
Held, overruling previous decisions in this jurisdiction, reversed. If the negligence of the defendant, by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended
to avoid, brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent,
it is a legal cause of the harm. Violation of a safety ordinance is negligence;
fairly interpreted, the ordinance was designed to prevent injury to the public
through meddling by children, thieves or others, with unlocked motors. The
appellant, having been guilty of such negligence causing such harm, is legally
liable in damages to appellee. Ross v. Hartman, (Ct. App. D. C. 1943) 139 F.
(2d) 14.
REs Jun1cATA-JunGMENT OF AcQuITI'AL IN CRIMINAL CAsE UNDER
SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST AcT NOT A BAR To CIVIL AcTION ARISING ouT oF
SAME FAcTs---The Government instituted this action in equity under sections 1,
2 and 3 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1 in the district court for the District
of Columbia in order to enjoin the defendant companies from monopolistic practices in connection with trade and commerce in gypsum products. The Government had previously brought a criminal action against the defendants in that
court under sections I and 2 of the same act, alleging a conspiracy to monopolize
trade in their products. The trial judge sustained the motion of defendants for
a directed verdict of not guilty and judgment was given accordingly. The defendants, in the present case, move for a summary judgment, arguing that the
previous judgment is res judicata of the issues here presented. Held, motion
denied. The majority of the court based its decision almost entirely on the fact
that the statute contemplated both types of action and stated that "a full ad judication in a criminal action between the same parties and involving the same
conspiracy would not be a bar in a subsequent civil action for injunctive relief." 2
Justice Stephens, while agreeing with the result reached by the majority,
thought that the statement quoted was too sweeping in its terms according to
the following reasoning. Had the criminal case been submitted to a jury, a judgment of acquittal would not be a bar to a subsequent civil action since criminal
cases require a higher standard of proof. A motion for a directed verdict may be
ruled upon by the court in defendant's favor on either of two theories: (a) although substantial evidence has been introduced of the elements of the charge
and defendant's connection with it, yet such facts do not show the existence of
any legal wrong; (b} although the indictment charges an offense, the evidence
is not sufficient to show that the offense was committed or, if committed, that
defendant was the wrong-doer. Under the first theory the motion is in the
nature of a demurrer to the evidence and, in effect, a demurrer to the indictment. A favorable judgment for defendant on this theory should, therefore, be
a bar to a subsequent civil action. Under the second theory, the judgment is that
the evidence is not substantial enough to support the charge. Since the meaning
of "substantial" differs in criminal and civil cases (in a criminal case the evidence
must convince beyond a reasonable doubt), when the judge uphold:s the motion
in a criminal case on the latter theory such a judgment should not be a bar to
1

15 U.S.C.A. (1941) §§ 1-3.

2

Principal case, p. 615.
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a subsequent civil action. The defendants' motion was made and decided on the
second theory and therefore the motion for summary judgment was correctly
denied. Since the majority did not take this distinction into consideration, the
defendants are entitled to a ruling on whether the doctrine of res judicata applies
where the decision of the criminal case has been favorable to a defendant on
motion for a directed verdict. United States v. United States Gypsum Co.,
(D.C.D.C. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 613.3
'
REs JuDICATA-WHAT Is THE SAME "CAUSE OF AcTioN" FOR THE PuRPosE OF APPLYING THE DocTRINE?-James Norwood, the plaintiff, brought
· this action in ejectment against the administrator of the estate of Ada L. McDannold and against Thomas A. McDonald, an alleged heir at law of the deceased, to establish his right by inheritance to la1td owned in fee simple 1;,y the
deceased at the time of her death. The plaintiff claimed to be sole heir by virtue
of his being the common-law husband of the deceased. The defense raised was
that the plaintiff had previously brought an action in equity against the same
defendants to establish his right to t~e same land on the ground that he had paid
the consideration for the land and thereby had become during the lifetime of the
deceased the beneficiary of a resulting trust, by reason of which the beneficial
interest had vested in him at her death; that the court found that the plaintiff
had not established his case by the required degree of proof (but it did not pass
on the rights of defendant McDonald as. heir) and that this judgment is res
judicata to all claims made in this action. The trial court gave judgment for
the defendants, notwithstanding a jury verdict to the contrary on the facts, and
the appellate court affirmed on the ground that the plantiff should have set up
in the first action all the claims he had to the land. Held, trial and appellate
courts reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings. A prior judgment
can be pleaded as res judicata to a cause of action only if it was rendered on the
same cause of action. Two causes of action are the same if the same facts will
sustain both; but if, as here, each arises out 6£ a different right (i.e., in the first
action, the right to land as the beneficiary of a trust, and, in the second, the right
to land as an heir) and each must be sustained by proof of a different set of facts,
they are not the same cause of action for the purpose of applying the doctrine of
res judicata. The court also discusses the possibility of, and finds no grounds for,
these being treated as inconsistant proceedings between which the plaintiff must
choose, and having chosen one, be forever barred from instituting the other. Norwood v. McDonald, (Ohio 1943) 52 N.E. (2d) 67.1
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES-UNFAIR COMPETITION IN THE UsE
OF THE WoRD "ScouT'' As LABEL FOR PocKET KNIVEs-Adolph Kastor &
Brothers, Inc., cutlery manufacturers, petitioned the court to review an order
3 Forest Revere Black, "Res Judicata and Conspiracy Cases Under the Sherman
Act," 30 KY. L. J. 255 at 281 (1942).
1 "Judgment-Bar of Causes of Action-Res Judicata," 14 UNiv. CmN. L. REv.
454 (1940); "Pleading and Procedure-Judgment in Action on Express Contract
as Res Judicata for Action on Implied Contract-Alternative Pleading," 6 Omo ST.
L. J. 340 (1940).
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of the Federal Trade Commission directing them to cease and desist from using
"scout," "scouting," or "boy scout" in connection with their cutlery. The petitioner, since 1910, had manufactured and sold for fifty cents a "Scout Set" consisting of a three-bladed pocket knife marked "Scout Knife" and a hunting knife.
The Boy Scouts of America, incorporated in I 910, now consent to and license
the sale of a two-bladed pocket knife costing one dollar and fifty cents, marked
"Official Knife," and bearing the name, insignia, and motto of the organization.
The commission found that the words "scout" and "scouting" had acquired a
secondary meaning as applied to the scouting movement even before incorporation of the organization. Held,1 order affirmed. The commission's finding as to
the Boy Scouts' superior interest in the word is supported by the evidence; the
facts also support the conclusion that the word "Scout," when applied to a boy's
pocket knife, suggests that the knife is sponsored by the Boy Scouts of America.
To test the propriety of the order a comparison must be made of the damage
which the infringer would suffer if the order were granted with the damage
which owner would suffer if it were refused. Kastor has shown no right to the
word except as a word of common speech nor any special benefit to himself from
its use, while the Boy Scouts have a cognizable legal interest in preventing the
public from accepting a product as sponsored by them which they do not, in
truth, sponsor. Adolph Kastor & Bros., Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission,
(C.A.A. 2d, 1943) 138 F. (2d) 824.2
TRusT&--REsULTING TRUST DocTRINE APPLIED DESPITE ILLEGALITY-

In 1927 the plaintiff, an alien, gave consideration for a one-sixteenth interest in a
fishing schooner then being built, but, on being advised by the builder that it was
illegal for her, as an alien, to take title in her own name, she took it in the name
of her American-born minor son, who is the defendant in this action. On completion of the vessel the builder had it licensed and enrolled under federal statutes 1 which provide for the licensing and enrolling of such vessels as a prerequi- •
site to their having the privileges of vessels of the United States and which also
provide for the forfeiture of such vessel if the registry, enrollment, or license was
obtained or used "knowingly or fraudulently," 2 or if any interest in a licensed
vessel be transferred to an alien or nonresident.8 The builder made oath as to
the ownership of the vessel as required by the statute,4 in the face of a provision
that a ship owned by a· noncitizen could not be enrolled,5 but he gave the son
as owner of the one-sixteenth· interest. The defendant, being now of age, has
claimed ownership of one-sixteenth of the vessel and the right to collect a pro1 The court points out that in making this decision it has not relied upon the clause
"words or phrases ..• used by the Boy Scouts of America in carrying out its program"
found in 36 U.S.C.A. (1942) § 27.
2 A similar case is noted in "Tradenames-Unfair Competition," 3 GA. B. J. 78
( I 940) . The problem is also discussed in 27 c!oRN. L. Q. 144 ( 194 I).

46 U.S.C.A. (1926) § 221.
Id. § 60.
8 Id. § 325.
4 Id. §§ 254, 259.
6 Id. §§ 255, II.

1

2
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portionate share of the earnings. The plaintiff, having become a citizen, filed
a bill in equity asking a decree that the deft:ndant hold title in 'trust for her. The
decree was granted in the trial court, from which decision the defendant appealed. Held, decree affirmed. On the authority of Cooley v. Cooley 6 a resulting trust vested in the plaintiff at the time she paid consideration for an interest
in the vessel; the vessel was not then under federal statutes since she was not yet
afloat on navigable waters. The plaintiff has not since then been divested of her
interest for there is no evidence of anyone obtaining or using the license or enrollment "knowingly or fraudulently," and no interest in a licensed vessel was
ever transferred to an alien. The court could deny relief on the ground of illegal
conduct on the part of the plaintiff but in this case public policy does not require
it. The court does not decide whether in an action for an accounting against
the other partner, which action he chose to defend, the plaintiff could still prevail. Bragav. Braga, (Mass. 1943) 51 N.E. (2d) 429.
TRusTS-PowER OF CouRT TO ORDER SUPPORT OF WIFE OR CHILDREN
OF BENEFICIARY UNDER DISCRETIONARY TRUST-The will of John T. Sullivan provided for a trust fund in the hands of his executors, the income to be
used for the support and maintenance of his invalid son, "as it is received or as
his needs may require," and any part of the res to be applied to the same use if,
in the judgment of the executors, it is necessary. The executors were given "full
and uncontrolled discretion as to the application of the said income and trust
estate for the uses aforesaid." The beneficiary's wife instituted this action to
compel trustees to pay sufficient sums for the support of herself and her invalid
son. The district court found that the plaintiff was in need of such support and
ordered defendant trustees to pay her fifty dollars per month. HeU, reversed and
remanded. Deciding the point for the first time in this jurisdiction, a discretionary trust for the support of a named beneficiary can be reached to satisfy his
wife's or child's claim for support. "Uncontrolled discretion" has the effect
merely of dispensing with reasonableness as a test of the trustee's conduct, but
does not deprive the court of the power to interfere when the trustee fails to
carry out duties under the trust as contemplated by the settlor. In such case, the
court may direct him to act or refrain from acting, set aside a transa~tion in
which he has acted, hold him liable for the results of his action or inaction, or
remove him, but it may not substitute its discretion for that of the trustee as was
done by the district court. In re Sullivan's Will, (Neb. 1943) I2 N.W. (2d)
148.1
WILLS - DEVOLUTION oF INTESTATE PROPERTY · WHERE Wroow
ELECTS TO TAKE BEQUEST UNDER WILL GIVEN IN LIEU OF DOWER AND
ALL OTHER CLAIMS -Testator directed his executor to assign certain shares
of stock in trust for his wife to paf the income therefrom to her for life; said
provision to be "in lieu and bar of dower and any and all claims my wife may
6

172 Mass. 476, 52 N.E. 631 (1899).

1 A note discussing the power of the court to interfere in a discretionary trust may
be found in 16 TULANE L. REv. 299 (1942).
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have against my estate and in fulfillment of a certain antenuptial agreement."
On death of the wife the principal of the trust was to be divided equally among
surviving sons and daughters, and the issue of any then deceased to take by representation. The residue of testator's estate was likewise to be assigned in trust
to pay income to his sons and daughters for a term of ten years, at the end of
which time the surviving sons were to get their equal share of the said residuary
estate, plus accumulated interest, issue of any deceased son to take an equal share
by right of representation, and to continue to pay interest on their respective
shares to each of testator's surviving daughters for life; on the death of any of
said daughters to convey her share to any surviving husband, or, if none, to any
surviving issue. The entire estate has been distributed according to the terms
of the will, except the one-fifth share of testator's daughter Rebecca, who recently
died without leaving a husband surviving her and without lineal descendants.
This suit in equity is brought by Rebecca's executrix, and others, to compel
trustee under testator's will to distribute the balance of the trust fund to testator's
heirs at law and next of kin. Held, the property remaining in the trust is intestate property belonging to testator's estate, and as such is distributable to
testator's heirs and next of kin determined as of the date of his death. The bequest to testator's widow was, in effect, a gift conditioned upon waiver of her
statutory rights to her husband's property, and, having made her election to take
under the will, the widow ( and her administrator) is barred from thereafter
asserting a claim to any of testator's property passing by intestacy. The court,
therefore, directs distribution of the fund to the heirs or legal representatives of
testator's five children, all of whom are now deceased, but who were testator's
sole heirs-at-law and next of kin at the time of his death. Huxley, et al. v. Security Trust Co., (Del. 1943) 33 A. (2d) 697.1
1

Cf. generally 68 A.L.R. 507 (1930), 93 A.L.R. 1384 (1934).

